ECMs will potentially improve the ability of both enforcers and courts to achieve some objectives of consumer protection law, the measures raise some significant concerns. Of particular concern is the extent to which they signal a move away from prosecution in cases where that would be the optimal response, and so compromise the ability of consumer protection law to achieve some of its most important objectives.
INTRODUCTION
Consumer law in the UK has always comprised both public and private law. 1 The principal aims of consumer law include protecting consumers from harm, raising trading standards, and providing redress where harm or loss is caused. The methods by which these relatively simple objectives are achieved are, however, varied and fragmented.
Despite considerable attention being paid to the limitations of the criminal law, the objectives of protecting consumers from harm and raising trading standards have longbeen achieved primarily through the creation and enforcement of regulatory offences. 2 Fourth, Regulatory Justice suggested that regulatory offences can lead to compliance deficit. 30 One reason enforcers seem to find it difficult to secure compliance is that they are limited in the extent to which they can require firms to act in specific ways to bring themselves back into compliance and to ensure that breaches are less likely to happen in future. This is addressed in detail later.
Fifth, concern was expressed that conviction does not necessarily reflect the stigma that should be attached to the wrongdoing in question. 31 There are two concerns here: first that prosecution generates excessive stigma, and second that it generates insufficient stigma. One aim of punishment under the criminal law is to ensure just deserts, and inappropriate labelling can compromise this. Any conviction should, so far as possible, reflect the seriousness of the wrongdoing, and the principal elements of such seriousness are culpability and harm. Most regulatory offences are over-inclusive in that they are satisfied where there is little or no harm and/or culpability. 32 However, some breaches of regulatory offences involve significant levels of harm and culpability. The regulatory offence is a rather blunt and inflexible tool which is ill-suited to respond to demands of a regime seeking to ensure just deserts, and the fact of conviction risks leaving an inappropriate label attached to the defendant.
Finally, Regulatory Justice contended that prosecuting a trader for a regulatory offence does not focus sufficiently on victims. 33 This is surely correct. In the context of consumer protection, prosecution has been widely regarded as an ineffective means of achieving restoration/redress. 34 Victims will frequently not be involved in proceedings and in many cases will not be traced. However, as will be explained below, it is important to remember that there are now several routes to redress that were unavailable at the time Regulatory Justice was published, and so the criticism may not be as compelling as it was previously. 35 The shortcomings of regulatory offences, and in particular of prosecution as the means of enforcing them, loomed large in the decision to create ECMs. But equally important were the limitations of the other principal enforcement tool available to consumer protection enforcers, namely the ability to seek enforcement orders under Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002.
B. Civil Enforcement and Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002: Role and Shortcomings
30 Macrory para 2.27. 31 Macrory paras 2.24 and 3.25. 32 Neither mens rea nor damage/loss are typically required for guilt. 33 Macrory para 1.21. 34 See e.g Peysner and Nurse Representative Actions. 35 See below.
with if the person does not continue or repeat the conduct, engage in such conduct in the course of his business or another business, and does not consent to or connive in the carrying out of such conduct by a body corporate with which he has a special relationship. 41 In considering whether to make an enforcement order, the court will have regard to whether the person has given an undertaking and has failed to comply with the 36 Sections 211 and 212 respectively. 37 Section 214 (1A). 38 Section 218(1)(c). 39 Section 214(2) defines it as consultation for the purpose of achieving particular objectives such as cessation of, or ensuring there is no repetition of, an infringement. 40 B. Lewin and J. Kirk Trading Standards Law and Practice 2 nd ed (Bristol 2011) 49. 41 Section 219(4).
impose any new obligations on businesses; it merely helped to ensure compliance with existing obligations. Traders could only be obliged to (a) stop breaking the law; and (b) agree not to break it in future. Perhaps the most striking weakness of part 8 in this regard was that it did not incorporate a mechanism through which consumers could receive compensation or similar redress. Although enforcement orders are admissible as evidence in civil proceedings, consumers still needed to seek redress through the courts or through an alternative means of dispute resolution. 47 In addition, part 8 did not allow enforcers or the courts to require businesses to take specific steps to improve the 47 Although enforcement orders are admissible as evidence in civil proceedings.
probability of compliance in future. Just as prosecution can be viewed as a blunt instrument to achieve the main objectives of consumer protection policy, so could part 8.
To the extent that these limitations explain the reluctance to use Part 8, the proposed reforms may make it a more attractive prospect. It is to the reforms that we now turn.
III: REFORM THROUGH ENHANCED CONSUMER MEASURES

A. Objectives and Choices
Difficulties with ensuring the effective enforcement of consumer law through the combination of prosecution and part 8 led the Government to look at reform. In its paper
Civil Enforcement Remedies, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS)
identified the key outcomes it sought as follows. 48 First was improving business compliance with the law; it aimed to achieve this by developing what it described as "forward looking measures to ensure the same or similar breach does not reoccur".
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Second was improved redress for consumers affected by the breach of consumer law.
This would be ensured by providing appropriate consumer redress schemes. The third objective was to develop more confident consumers who are empowered to exercise greater consumer choice. BIS saw this as being achieved by "measures to improve the ability of new and existing customers to make a free and informed choice".
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To some extent, these objectives reflected the "Penalties Principles" outlined in Regulatory Justice. 51 Macrory hoped these would build "a common understanding of what a sanctioning regime should achieve amongst regulators and the regulated community, and in turn… act as a framework for regulators when considering what sort of sanction or enforcement action to take." 52 According to the Principles, a sanction should do the following: aim to change the behaviour of the offender; aim to eliminate any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance; be responsive and consider what is appropriate for the particular offender and regulatory issue, which can include punishment and the public stigma that should be associated with a criminal conviction; be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm caused; aim to restore the harm caused by regulatory non-compliance, where appropriate; and aim to deter future noncompliance. 53 These will be reflected upon in the context of the reforms.
The Government identified two ways of meeting its objectives. expectation that traders will initiate discussions and offer solutions helps to create a culture of responsibility. Indeed, on the assumption that traders are more likely to comply where they feel some ownership of the solution, it may be more effective to encourage and incentivise traders to develop their own responses. Second, it is a widelyaccepted criticism of both prosecution and part 8 that they are resource-intensive.
There is ample evidence a recalcitrant trader can cause significant difficulties for an enforcer wishing to use Part 8, and while this problem remains under the new regime, it might be mitigated by giving traders some influence (at an earlier stage) over the content of ECMs. To the extent that traders rather than enforcers develop proposals for redress, enforcers' (increasingly) scarce resources are protected.
Proportionality, redress and deterrence
In addition to the requirement for proportionality noted above, section 219B(4) states that an order or undertaking may include enhanced consumer measures in the redress category:
(a) only in a loss case, and (b) only if the court or enforcer (as the case may be) is satisfied that the cost of such measures to the subject of the enforcement order or undertaking is unlikely to be more than the sum of the losses suffered by consumers as a result of the conduct which has given rise to the enforcement order or undertaking.
This means that redress measures can only be used if the amount payable as compensation is likely to be no more than the losses suffered by consumers as a result of the conduct. It is the responsibility of the enforcer to decide whether redress should be paid, to calculate the loss that consumers have suffered and to calculate the cost to the trader of compliance. 65 The OFT raised significant concerns about this. where greater onus is placed on the business to carry out investigations, provide the enforcer with information and consult before establishing the scheme. 67 Of course, where redress schemes are proposed, businesses will play an important role in operating those schemes, for example by identifying and contacting consumers.
Regulatory Justice stated that one aim of a sanction was to eliminate the financial gain or benefit from non-compliance. The Redress measures focus less on ensuring that a trader does not gain from contravention, and more on ensuring that the measures do not impose a greater cost on the trader than the loss to the consumer. In the desire to ensure proportionality, it might be argued that sight has been lost of the need to eliminate any gain and provide appropriate redress. Moreover, by focusing on the need to avoid benefits to consumers being greater than losses to traders, the need for deterrence could be lost.
One justification for placing such stringent obligations on enforcers is that the redress category is concerned solely with redress. It is not to be viewed as a punishment or, as the term is typically used, a sanction. However, it is submitted that ECMs should be able to play a role in deterrence. In this regard, they appear to fall short. A profit-maximising trader which believes it is unlikely to be prosecuted for a consumer protection offence may decide to cause loss to consumers safe in the knowledge that it will not be required through the redress category to pay more than the consumers have lost. Referring back to optimal deterrence, the perceived benefit of contravention outweighs (perhaps significantly) the perceived detriment. Most traders will not be quite so calculating; and there is evidence that traders comply with the law for a range of reasons beyond the threat of a sanction or financial loss. 68 However, some will take advantage and the restrictions on enforcers' powers appear to limit the ability for redress measures to ensure deterrence. While the principal aim of redress measures is to provide redress, given that they will frequently be used as an alternative to prosecution, it is important that deterrence is not lost.
It is true that there are some ways in which redress measures may still incorporate an element of deterrence. First, the cost referred to in section 219B(4)(b) does not include the administrative costs associated with taking the measures. In practice, that may provide some limited deterrent, as the costs of complying with the measure may mean that a trader will be obliged to expend more through a combination of compensation and compliance costs that s/he received as a result of the contravention.
Second, it is possible that the trader will receive some negative publicity as a result of establishing the scheme. The choice category (considered below) is largely premised on the desirability of consumers having information about the wrongdoing (broadly understood) of traders, but that information may also emerge through the creation of redress schemes. The CRA makes clear that a publication requirement that is included in an enforcement order or undertaking is not an ECM, and businesses are often required to publish the terms of undertakings along with a corrective statement. Publication is important both to inform consumers of the trader's wrongdoing, and to assist monitoring that trader's conduct to see if undertakings or orders are breached. Regulatory Justice saw it is important that enforcers should consider what is appropriate including the stigma that should be associated with a criminal conviction. 69 It should be remembered that ECMs will generally be used where there is no conviction, and may be used where there is no offence (although this article is of course focusing on where the criminal law has been breached). Negative publicity will generally aid deterrence but it is vital for proportionality and fair labelling, that it accurately reflects the wrongdoing involved.
Redress measures in context
It is easier for consumers to receive redress under other provisions than it was when ECMs were first being formulated. This is an important factor in assessing the costs and order in any case where the section empowers it to do so. Where a prosecution is successful, for example under the CPUTRs, and a consumer has suffered loss, the use of this power avoids consumers having to pursue the matter further. While this will be useful in some cases, it should be remembered that the power to make compensation orders has been available for decades but has been rarely used in consumer protection cases. The OFT Annual Report for 2011-12 identified that the 1860 prosecutions under consumer protection legislation resulted in less than £100,000 of compensation in total.
While this relates to a period before the 2012 Act (when there was merely a discretion to consider compensation orders) it is not clear that the legislation will make a significant difference. One reason is that in consumer protection cases, the criminal courts will seldom have details of all victims at the time of sentencing. As a result, the compensation order may not be an appropriate method of providing redress. Another is that an important aim of ECMs is to take cases away from the criminal courts, so in most cases where redress would be appropriate there will be no prosecution for a compensation order to follow.
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A second development is that the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014 give consumers private law rights where certain provisions of the CPRs are 69 Macrory box E2. 70 Given the compliance stance of enforcers prosecution is not the norm now.
breached. Where a consumer enters into a contract or makes a payment, the trader engages in a prohibited practice (meaning an aggressive or misleading action) and that practice is a significant factor in the consumer's decision to enter the contract or make the payment, the consumer will be entitled to redress. 71 If the trader does not voluntarily pay compensation, the consumer will need to pursue the matter. This may be made easier with the implementation of the Directive on Consumer ADR by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Regulations 2015. The Directive aims to give EU consumers the opportunity to resolve disputes without going to court, regardless of product, the service type or the place of purchase. Although there is no obligation on most traders to agree to use ADR it will in practice give many consumers an additional avenue for redress. One interesting argument that might be made is that the existence of alternative routes to redress (such as ADR) makes redress schemes disproportionate.
However, compensation orders, the private right to redress and ADR are all best-suited to cases where there is one victim, or a small number of easily identifiable victims. In cases where loss is more widespread, ECMs are likely to be particularly appropriate.
Limitations and innovations
There remains a lack of detail about how redress schemes will operate, but some aspects (and limitations) are clear. BIS has stated that the remedies would be based around "mechanistic schemes to deliver particular outcomes rather than the outcomes themselves" and that "performance would therefore be based on the technical requirements of the individual schemes." 72 This means that consumers may not get 100% of their money back through a scheme. For example, there will be cases when a large number of consumers have suffered different levels of loss. It may be judged in such cases that it would not be just and reasonable to impose a scheme, or that it would only be just and reasonable to do so if a trader can make consumers an offer based on the average of the loss. 73 This would merely be an offer. There is no obligation on consumers to accept that offer and they can always pursue other means to obtain redress. It will, however, be possible for the trader to require that if a consumer accepts redress under the Scheme he or she waives the right to take additional action to recover the money. One innovative aspect of the Redress Category is that enforcers may use it to pursue measures that are in the collective interests of consumers. An example of how this might operate is provided in the Guidance. 75 In this example, a petrol station with a record of compliance was discovered to have faults with 3 of its 12 pumps, resulting in their dispensing a quarter of a litre less fuel than is shown on the pump. Working with the enforcer, the owner discovered that the faulty pumps had been used 5000 times with each customer being overcharged £3 on average. It was not possible to identify the affected customers, at which point the owner became uncooperative. The enforcer judged that it would not be just, reasonable and proportionate to require the business to try to compensate the individual customers in these circumstances. The low amount of loss per customer and the difficulty of identifying the customers in question meant that a redress measure to compensate them would not be appropriate. In cases such as this,
ECMs allow action to be taken which removes the profit from the activity, but does not compensate the affected consumers. The Guidance suggests that in this case, the enforcer could bring a civil action to obtain an order for the business to pay £15,000 to a local consumer charity. In some cases an ECM might include a combination of compensation to consumers and a payment in the collective interests of consumers. For example, if the business were able to identify a proportion of individual consumers who had been overcharged, such as those who had paid by credit card, it would be possible to require the business to compensate those and to pay the balance (up to the amount the business had benefited from the error) to charity.
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Some difficult questions are left unanswered. For instance, in the example above the trader paid £15,000 to a charity because it was deemed that consumers could not be traced. In other cases, those consumers who could be traced were compensated, and a payment made to a charity to reflect the difference between the compensation and the benefit gained. In both cases, the trader paid an amount to reflect the gain. But what happens if the other consumers subsequently come forward to demand compensation? It is presumed that they will be compensated through other means and it is foreseeable that this will happen. As explained above, redress measures cannot be used where the cost of the measures is unlikely to be more than the sum of the losses suffered by 75 2015 Guidance Case Study 6. 76 Ibid.
consumers. In such a case the cost of the measures is not (it is 15k and the consumers have lost 15k) but the total cost to the business will be more if it also has to compensate individuals outside those measures. It might be possible for businesses to argue that the uncertainty about whether consumers will pursue action for redress makes a payment to charity which reflects the full amount lost disproportionate. It is submitted that such an argument should fail. It is important that the business in question does not benefit from its wrongdoing (even where that wrongdoing lacks any significant culpability) and that consumers should not lose their right to compensation. A difference can be drawn between the amount of the redress measures (in this example 15k) and the amount of the redress (15k plus redress paid outside the measures).
It is important the traders take all reasonable steps to contact affected individuals, for example by advertising in national, regional or specialist press and by making use of social media. It will be up to enforcers and the courts to ensure that they do this.
However, traders may be under incentives not to take such steps. For instance, they may regard it as simpler and potentially more beneficial to pay money to charity and try to gain some positive publicity for doing so. There is evidence that under RESA, traders will frequently make charitable donations (such as to environmental groups) as part of an enforcement undertaking. measures with that purpose which may have the effect of improving compliance with consumer law more generally."
The focus here is not on looking at how redress can be provided for past breaches, but on how future breaches might best be avoided. Regulatory Justice pointed to "compliance deficit" being one of the limitations of prosecution, with courts and enforcers limited in their ability (a) to require firms to act in specific ways to bring themselves back into compliance; and (b) to ensure that breaches are less likely to happen in future.
Whereas Macrory saw these functions being achieved through compliance notices, the CRA envisages their being delivered through the compliance category of ECMs. As with the redress category, there is an emphasis on flexibility and this explains why there is no list of actions in the Legislation. However, the Guidance does identify some possible measures which appear to fall within this category, namely: signing up to a Primary Authority Scheme; appointing a compliance officer; providing better staff training and guidance; undertaking internal spot checks (and keeping records of these); collecting and acting on consumer feedback; introducing a robust complaints handling scheme;
and signing up to a certified ADR Scheme and committing to be bound by its decisions.
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The Guidance gives an illustration of how this power might operate. In this example, a consumer paid an online retailer an additional fee for next day delivery but found that the goods were delivered late. Enforcers investigated and discovered that this was the result of short-term staff shortages and poor staff training. Some steps were taken voluntarily by the firm: consumers were refunded their additional fee and temporary staff were sought. However, the firm refused to take steps to improve the staff training which enforcers believed to be necessary to avoid repetition of the delays.
The enforcer sought an enforcement order to change and improve staff training and to designate a member of staff to act as a customer complaints manager. The Court regarded the proposed measures are just, reasonable and proportionate and that they would ensure there is no repeat of the breach.
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There are a number of difficulties with this example. First, it is rare that such facts would arise. A trader that is generally compliant and responsible would be unlikely to refuse to improve staff training or agree that a member of existing staff be given the responsibility of acting as a customer complaints manager. A business might object to being made to employ an entirely new member of staff to take on such a role, but it is doubtful that this would be demanded of a small firm as it is unlikely that that would be just reasonable and proportionate. Second, the example concerns legislation that has been breached "inadvertently". It is easy to see compliance measures as a more website, care needs to be taken to identify how, precisely, they have fallen short. For them to be "shamed" there has to be some wrongdoing deserving of such shame, and it is easy for consumers to misinterpret adverse publicity. The distinction between naming and shaming websites, and customer review/feedback sites is by no means a clear one.
Reference was made above to the danger that prosecution will sometimes be a disproportionate response to breach, and one reason for this is that it might be taken to imply stigma when such stigma was not deserved. Traders may, of course, challenge orders which contain ECMs on the basis of their being disproportionate, but one problem with adverse publicity is that its impact is difficult to quantify, particularly in advance.
It is worth digging a little more deeply into the issue of proportionality here. As noted above, ECMs must be just, reasonable and proportionate. Where an enforcer seeks an undertaking, it is likely that there will be discussion about the justice, reasonableness Where an order is sought, it will mean either that it has not been possible to obtain assurances or that assurances obtained have been breached. The court will be able to take a range of factors into account when deciding whether an order might be unjust, unreasonable or disproportionate. The decided cases on enforcement orders are not particularly helpful as they do not concern ECMs. The lack of detail in legislation as to what ECMs may require is deliberate so as to allow a maximum degree of flexibility. As has been shown, the Guidance provides some assistance, but significant doubt remains about how willing the courts will be to make orders which place what might be viewed as onerous demands on traders. One difficulty is that the Guidance provides relatively obvious examples of conduct that would justify orders containing ECMs: a garage owner who becomes uncooperative after over-changing customers; an online retailer which refuses to improve staff training after breaching a promise of next day delivery; and a business that describes itself as offering a price reduction and closing down when neither is true. The respective requirements in the orders appear eminently reasonable:
payment of the amount wrongly obtained to a local charity; improving staff training and designating a member of staff as consumer complaints manager; and requiring the business to display notices in store, on the website, on social media and in the local press notifying consumers of what they have done wrong. There will be far more difficult cases in practice where the court will have to consider the impact on the trader and the benefit to consumers in far more detail to ascertain whether the order might be unjust, unreasonable or disproportionate. Particular difficulty is likely to arise where the enforcer seeks an order to use ECMs in combination. It was noted above that while redress measures will typically take precedence when using ECMs in combination might be disproportionate, it will sometimes be possible to use all three measures in combination.
It is important that the courts show a willingness to accept such measures where significant benefits would be obtained. It should be remembered that the different categories of ECM have discrete and important objectives. Redress measures are largely concerned with compensation; compliance measures with reducing the probability of further contraventions and choice measures with improving the ability of consumer to make informed choices and exert market discipline. It is perhaps where choice measures form part of the order that disproportionality is most likely to arise. This is because it is the measure whose impact is most difficult to predict. While there is evidence that similar powers can work well as a deterrent, and as such as a way of raising standards and improving compliance, this is partly because of the danger that they might operate in a disproportionate manner. 93 Literature on adverse publicity reveals significant concern that the impact of negative information can be disproportionate. 94 It may be that where choice measures form part of an enforcement order that traders will have the best chance of challenge on the bases of justice, reasonableness and proportionality.
A further point is that if there is significant wrongdoing we might expect more explicit punishment. In particular, where conduct is deserving of shame, we might expect prosecution to follow so as to reflect that. 95 It has been noted that adverse publicity can operate as a form of punishment, but there is a reluctance to view ECMs in this way. It is to the relationship between ECMs, prosecution and punishment that we now turn.
IV. ECMs, PROSECUTION AND THE RETREAT FROM PUNISHMENT
When ECMs were first proposed there was considerable doubt about whether they could be used alongside prosecution. The Government was eager to move cases from criminal to civil courts and, where undertakings were secured by enforcers, out of the courts altogether. One sentence in the Consultation was a particular cause for concern: " As has been explained above, ECMs play an important role in addressing many of the shortcomings associated with the enforcement of consumer protection law. Despite their limitations, they will make it easier for courts and enforcers to secure redress, achieve compliance and facilitate choice. But they do not sanction the trader, in the sense of imposing a punishment. There will be many cases where the imposition of punishment is not only desirable but essential because of the wrongdoing involved. Were prosecution to be unavailable alongside ECMs, how should enforcers approach a trader who engaged in conduct that undoubtedly warranted a criminal penalty, but which also led to significant loss to consumers? Denying access to ECMs on the basis that a prosecution is necessary would be perverse. Enforcers have always been able to use Part 8 alongside criminal prosecution, but the Government appeared not to appreciate this. In its response to consultations, the Government stated that "as an alternative [my emphasis] to criminal prosecution" consumer law enforcers can seek an Enforcement
Order."
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The Guidance now makes clear that while in most cases where the measures are appropriate they will be an alternative to criminal prosecution, "there may be cases where the offences are serious enough to warrant them being used in conjunction with criminal prosecution". 99 A case study in the Guidance gives an example of how prosecution might be used alongside ECMs. It concerns a business selling mobility aids through a combination of cold calling and high pressure doorstep selling. In addition the products supplied were often not fit for purpose and priced at an amount higher than that originally quoted. 100 The company and its directors were prosecuted and a conviction was achieved. The enforcer then obtained an enforcement order under the redress category. The 20 consumers who wanted to return their mobility aid and obtain a refund were able to do so, while the five consumers who wanted to keep their aid received the difference between the price quoted and the price paid.
The decision to allow prosecution to be taken alongside the ECMs is undoubtedly the correct one, and the example given is one where prosecution and ECMs should be able to work together. But the reluctance of the Government for the two to be combined remains a deep cause for concern. The desire to move cases from the criminal courts is understandable, and there is little doubt that there will be breaches of consumer A second aim of imposing punishment/penalties is to change behaviour. The extent to which ECMs achieve this has been discussed above, particularly in the context of compliance measures. Traditional theories of punishment can be divided between those that are consequentialist and those that are non-consequentialist. Retribution is a non-consequentialist theory; the punishment is imposed to reflect the defendant's wrongdoing. However, of more obvious relevance to consumer protection are consequentialist theories. 106 These justify punishment on the basis of the need to change the defendant (or at least, the defendant's conduct). Where regulatory offences are concerned, changing behaviour is perhaps the principal aim of prosecution (or, indeed, other forms of penalty). This might be conceived in different ways. For example, we might punish in order to deter the trader from engaging in similar conduct in future (individual deterrence) or in order to deter others from committing similar wrongdoing (general deterrence). It might be argued in some cases that punishment has a role in rehabilitation, although this is likely to be rare. 107 There are significant concerns with the notion of deterrence in the narrow sense of deterring someone from deliberately breaking the law. Regulatory Justice focused of course on the shortcomings of prosecution for regulatory offences and there is no doubt that prosecution (and in particular, the consequences of being prosecuted) were inadequate. The importance of enforcers providing "credible deterrence" has come particularly to the fore in some areas, such as financial regulation. 108 The need to deter th March 2015) magistrates' courts have not been restricted to specified upper limits when deciding the level fine to impose upon defendants. This will apply to some pieces of consumer protection legislation. It means that at least in some cases, it is possible for the courts to impose penalties that are more likely both to deter, and to reflect the degree of wrongdoing involved.
As has been recognized, some traders are amoral calculators, incentivised to comply only by the credible threat of a compelling sanction. 109 There seems to be broad agreement that deterrence, achieved through the criminal law, has a role in dealing with such traders. But a number of caveats should be added. First, it is far from clear that enforcers will be inclined to prosecute even where there is evidence of mens rea. The push towards moving cases from criminal to civil courts is likely to mean that some cases which involve high levels of culpability are diverted away from the criminal process. Second, there is a compelling argument that threatening prosecution focuses the minds of traders and incentivises them to take greater care, and to devote more resources to checking, monitoring, supervising, and training. This has been seen as a rationale for regulatory offences. In the Trade Descriptions case of Wings v Ellis, Lord
Scarman famously said that the point of prosecution was not the enforcement of the law so much as the maintenance of trading standards. 110 It has been recognized that when the criminal law is used against businesses, its purpose includes the encouraging of good practice. 111 Consumer protection offences are examples of regulatory offences which incentivise care by being subject to due diligence defences. A trader who has done all that he or she reasonable could to avoid the commission of the offence is not guilty.
Some of this risks being lost in the move away from the prosecution. It is hoped, of course, that the wish to avoid ECMs will also encourage good practice. It should also be remembered that informal enforcement takes place against the background of the threat of more formal action. It may be that knowledge on the part of traders that enforcers can prosecute, and courts can impose ECMs will focus the minds of traders on their obligations. But the obstacles placed in the way of formal action make this less of threat than it might be.
V. CONCLUSIONS
There is little doubt that the ability of the courts and of enforcers to secure positive outcomes for consumers is strengthened by the creation of ECMs. The weaknesses of relying on the prosecution of traders and the seeking of undertakings and enforcement orders to deliver the aims of consumer protection law are well-established; at least some making it easier for enforcers to procure agreements from, and the courts to impose requirements on, traders, thus reducing the probability of future contravention. Choice measures will not only allow for the dissemination of information that is likely to improve consumer decision-making but will also provide a further incentive for traders both to choose to comply in the first place, and to choose to take care to avoid careless breaches that might lead to negative publicity. Although ECMs are not generally conceived as sanctions or penalties, they may operate as such in some cases. To the extent that they do, they may sometimes operate more successfully as a deterrent, and better reflect the stigma that should attach to a particular contravention, than would prosecution. The existence of ECMs means that enforcers will sometimes be able to negotiate better outcomes for consumers who have suffered detriment, while putting in place measures to reduce the chances of conduct being repeated.
Despite these advances, concerns remain. The procedural obstacles that enforcers face will frequently make it difficult for them to achieve optimal outcomes. It is disappointing that rather than overcome these obstacles, the changes may have in some respects have increased them. It is extremely important that prosecution can be used alongside ECMs. Had they been alternatives, as was originally mooted, enforcers would have found themselves in the undesirable position of choosing between the seeking of positive outcomes for consumers, and the imposition of an appropriate penalty upon a wrongdoer. Typically, this would be a choice between restoration or retribution when both were demanded. Despite what was said above about the potential for an ECM to sometimes operate in a manner similar to a punishment, they are no substitute for prosecution where the seriousness of a transgression justifies that response. However, it is important not only that enforcers can pursue prosecution where that is the most fitting response, but that they do so. The Government's reluctance to see these actions being taken in combination may still translate into cases which deserve prosecution being diverted from the criminal courts. This is regrettable in terms of appropriate labelling, but also from an instrumental perspective, as it may reduce the ability of the law to incentivise compliance. In this regard the changes introduced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 can be seen as both a step forward and a step backwards.
